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Master's Defamation of His Servant
Charles A. Caruso*
W HILE THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ostensibly permits an
unadulterated freedom of speech by prohibiting the Congress
from making any law which would abridge "freedom of speech," 1
the right of one man to speak indiscriminately concerning another
has been curtailed by sources other than the Constitution. 2 The law
of defamation has evolved through the years as a protection of one's
interest in acquiring, retaining, and enjoying a wholesome reputation,
or at least as good a reputation as one's conduct and character war-
rant his enjoying.3 The question now arises, as it does so frequently
when one right must be held in balance against another, is one's right
to unconditionally utter any statement he so wishes subservient to
another's right to a reputation free from the impairments of defama-
tion? The question has lost its youth along with the First Amendment
of the United States Constitution; yet the decisions and authority, as
to which right is the more fundamental and which should be sub-
rogated to which, are still widely divided.
To demonstrate the divergent opinions in the area, one need look
only to a recent comment made by Mr. Justice Black during a public
interview. In response to a direct question, Justice Black said:
I have no doubt myself that the provision, as written and adopted,
intended that there should be no libel or defamation law in the
United States under the United States Government, just absolutely
none so far as I am concerned.4
From a contrary point of view, Judge Learned Hand, in reversing
the dismissal of a complaint in libel, upheld the right of a man to pro-
tect his reputation in the course of his opinion concerning the defama-
tion of an attorney's reputation.
A man may value his reputation even among those who do not em-
brace the prevailing moral standards; and it would seem that the
jury should be allowed to appraise how far he should be indemnified
for the disesteem of such persons. 5
*B.B.A., Ohio University; Second-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 U. S. Const., Amend. I.
2 Donnelly, History of Defamation, 1949 Wis. L. R. 99, 125 (1949).
3 I Harper & James, Law of Torts 349 (1956).
4 Statement of Justice Black in reference to the First Amendment of the Constitu-
tion taken from: Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Inter-
view, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 557 (1962).
5 Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 151 F. 2d 733, 734 (2d Cir. 1945).
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Thus, while the tort of defamation has been recognized since the middle
ages, 6 it remains as an area of the law replete with anomalies and
absurdities. The greatest anomaly concerning defamation in the
American Courts would appear to be the violent collision which occurs
when the Constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression clashes
with our sympathy for the injury reputation.8
As there are far too many areas in which injury to reputation-
rears its head, this paper will concern itself with those torts which
occur as between the master and servant. While at first blush the
topic area may appear to be narrow and rather academic, it should be
remembered that approximately ninety per cent of the working force
in America is composed of salaried employees,9 i.e. servants. Thus,
the opportunities for the occurrence of torts of defamation between
master and servant are many and the case law multitudinous. This
master-servant relationship is a breeding ground not only for the tort
itself, but for many variations in the manner in which it is committed.
It will be the purpose of this paper to identify the manner in which the
tort is committed, the steps that have been taken to alleviate the wrong
which so frequently occurs under the master-servant relationship and
to discuss those steps which have not been taken towards a remedy.
The Conditional Privilege-A Remedy?
American law early recognized the need for a freedom of speech
so as to allow a degree of fair comment and healthy criticism.'0 How-
ever, as this objective was severely restricted due to the common-law
doctrine concerning defamation, the Courts devised a defense referred
to as the conditional privilege." The conditional privilege is said to
extend to those communications which are exercised in a reasonable
manner and for a proper purpose. 12 It has been more specifically
defined in regard to communications stemming from the master-servant
relationship.
A master, when communicating a statement which is defamatory
to the reputation of his servant, must make such a statement in the
furtherance of his own business concerns 13 or in the interests of an-
6 Donnelly, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 100.
7 Prosser, Torts, 754 (3d ed. 1964).
s Ibid.
9 U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: pp. 216, 234
(85th ed. 1964).
10 Baynes, Torts-Libel and Slander-Defenses of Qualified Privilege and Fair Com-
ment, 41 No. Car. L. Rev. 153 (1962-63).
11 Ibid.
12 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 7, at 819.
13 Id. at 805.
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other who has an equal "right to know" of the servant's conduct. 14
For example, in an early English case, Watt v. Langsdon,15 which is
parallel to American decisions, a director of the company learned of an
employee's escapades with his house maid and communicated the
information to the chairman of the board of his company. While the
court failed to clearly demonstrate the substantive relationship this
information had to the employee's work, it did state that the communi-
cation was privileged as the chairman was a party in interest.1 Thus,
it would appear that a prerequisite to a master's conditional privilege
is his valid (defensive) interest in the substance of that which he freely
communicates.
Still another essential of the conditional privilege is a lack of malice
on the part of the employer who makes the communication.' 7 Where
there is a circumstance which indicates the existence of a conditional
privilege, the demonstration of malice on the part of the speaker will
eradicate the privilege and render him liable as though the privilege
never existed.ls The existence of malice, therefore, is fatally destruc-
tive to the defense of conditional privilege.
Yet another necessary ingredient to the defense of conditional
privilege lies in the employer's belief that what he is communicating
is true. 19 In order to avail himself of the privilege, the master must
not only believe his statements to be true, but must equate the value
of disclosing his ideas against the benefit such a disclosure would
produce.20 This element would appear to be more of an indication
of the presence of malice than an independent factor in establishing
the privilege. 21
Destruction of the Conditional Privilege
Although the conditional privilege was designed to protect the
defendant-master in the making of statements which would further
his interests, it appears that in a great many instances the privilege
14 Id. at 807.
15 I. K. B. 130, 69 Amer. L. Reports, 1005, 1017 (1929).
16 See Ranous v. Hughes, 30 Wis. 2d 452, 141 N. W. 2d 251 (1966). Here a board
member published a letter which was defamatory to a teacher's reputation. How-
ever, as the publication was made during a board meeting attended by principals
and other parties in interest, it was considered privileged.
17 Wittenberg, Dangerous Words 62 (1947). See also Colatan v. New York World
Telegram Corp., 16 New York Supp. 2d 706 (1940).
18 Shepard, Libel: Publication to a stenographer: Excess of Privilege, 6 Cornell L. Q.
430 (1921).
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has worked an undue hardship on the plaintiff-servant. For example,
in the recent case, Burris v. Morton F. Plant Hospital,22 the doctrine
was succinctly stated concerning the destruction of an employer's con-
ditional privilege. The defendant hospital through its head nurse and
hospital director made statements concerning a nurse who was their
employee, which showed the nurse to be incompetent and careless in
her professional capacity. The statements concerning the nurse's
abilities were made between the hospital director and the head nurse
in the hospital during business hours. Concerning the element of
malice, the Court stated that since these communications were made
in the conduct of business, a presumption of a lack of malice rests with
the defendant.2 3 This presumption, once established, due to the ex-
istence of a privileged occasion, remains in effect until rebutted by
evidence of malice sufficient to overcome a rebuttable presumption.
24
It appears that such a "privileged occasion" arises whenever the
master-servant relationship exists.25
The employee who believes he has been wronged by the state-
ments of his employer may penetrate the employer's "privileged occa-
sion" shield by demonstrating that the statements were not made in the
conduct of the employer's business or in the furtherance of the inter-
ests of another to whom the employer owes a duty.26 This situation
most often occurs where the master has made statements to one who
has no right to the information. Thus in a case, Stefania v. McNiff, 27
where the plaintiff's employer posted statements in the employer's
recreation room which tended to hold the employee up to ridicule
and embarrassment, it was held that as the other employees had no
right or interest in the information posted, the defense of conditional
privilege was not available to the employer. The fact that those to
whom the statements were published were also employees did not
save the employer's privilege. The party or parties to whom the state-
ments are directed must have a legitimate28 interest in the contents
of the statement.
22 204 So. 2d 521 (D. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. 1967); See also Appell v. Dickinson, 73
So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1954).
23 It is interesting to note that this is the general rule and also enunciated in many
Ohio cases. See, 34 Ohio Jur. 2d 312-13 (1958).
24 See, Popke v. Hoffman, 21 Ohio App. 454, 153 N. E. 248 (1889); DeAngelo v. W. T.
Grant Co., 64 Ohio L. Abs. 366, 111 N. E. 2d 773 (1952).
25 Although this statement is dangerously broad, the explanation of qualified priv-
ilege invariably contains, as example, the master-servant relationship. See Prosser,
op. cit. supra note 7 at 806, also 34 Ohio Jur. 2d, op. cit. supra note 23 at 257.
26 See, 33 Am. Jur. 168-70 (1936); See also Prins v. Holland-North America Mort-
gage Co., 107 Wash. 206, 181 P. 680 (1919).
27 267 N. Y. Supp. 2d 854 (1966).
28 Legitimate, in this sense, denotes an interest above that of idle curiosity. See
Hocks v. Sprangens, 65 N. J. Super. 112, 87 N. W. 1101 (1901).
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However, while the Court in the Stefania case stated that the
servant's fellow employees did not have a legitimate interest in the
faults of their fellow employee, other courts have seen fit to declare
the same employee interests as adequate to support the employer's
privilege. Thus, in Combes v. Montgomery Ward,29 it was held that
two employees learning of the alleged dishonesty of their fellow em-
ployee, through the statements and questions of the employer, did not
deprive the master of his right to the defense of conditional privilege.
The Court in this case stated that since the employer had a legitimate
interest in the knowledge which the two employees might have con-
cerning the theft, his communications and interrogatories directed to
them were covered by the privilege.
Contrasted with the Combes and Stefania cases is Sokolay v.
Edlin 30 wherein that Court arrived at a far different conclusion as to
the relationship of the parties involved. The employer was the owner
of a pharmacy in which he employed the plaintiff as a pharmacist.
While the business was being investigated concerning an illegal traffick-
ing in barbituates, the employer, in the presence of a part-time cus-
todian, verbally accused the plaintiff of participating in the illegal
acts. Much to the chagrin of the pharmacist, this Court held that
the communication to the custodian was privileged as he was involved
in the business of the pharmacy. Needless to say, the Court did not
attempt to explain or clarify the extent of the custodian's involvement
in the business, nor did it make any pronouncement as to the relation-
ship of the custodian's duties to the dispensing of drugs. In Sokolay,
the Court seemed satisfied with the mere fact that the custodian was
on the payroll and was thereby a party having a sufficient interest in
the communications to justify the Court's upholding of the defendant-
master's privilege. 31
This, then, is the confused state in which we find the conditional
privilege. However, while the practicalities of conditional privilege
may be interesting from an academic point of view, there appears
to be, inherent in the concept of the conditional privilege, an element
of antiquity when the concept is silhouetted against the background of
modern living.
29 119 Utah 407, 228 P. 2d 272 (1951).
30 65 N. J. Super. 112, 167 A. 2d 211 (1961).
31 The author is well aware of the discrepancies in the fact patterns in the Stefania,
Combes, and Sokolay cases. They are inserted at this point in an attempt to de-
scribe the "interest" required to uphold the qualified privilege. The distinguishing
facts in each case will be discussed and analyzed at a later point in the article.
May, 1969
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The Conditional Privilege in American Law Today
Though the courts continue to show a tendency to protect the
defendant-master's conditional privilege in actions brought against him
by his plaintiff-servants, 32 it is not apparent why they do so. As the law
of defamation is encumbered with anomalies and contradictions,3 3 so
too, as the cases indicate, is the law concerning the master's conditional
privilege.
As is evidenced by the drastic contrast in the Sokolay3 4 and
Stefania35 cases, the courts are far from agreement in determining
when the communication is made to a party with a legitimate interest
and when it is made to one having no interest. While in Stefania, it
was held that employees on the same business level as the plaintiff
did not have a sufficient interest to justify the defendant's defama' ory
statements being communicated to them, Sokolay held that even a
custodian had a sufficient interest in the actions of a pharmacist to
justify the defense of conditional privilege. It would appear that the
Stefania decision is logically the better decision. It is hardly reason-
able that a custodian could have a legitimate interest, business or other-
wise, in the actions of the company pharmacist.
A decision recently handed down in a case similar to those men-
tioned seems to indicate a trend on the part of the courts to strictly
confine their interpretation of a party with a legitimate interest. In
Sias v. General Motors,36 the Court was confronted with an employer
who had discussed and explained to employees the circumstances sur-
rounding the discharge of an employee who had been performing a
task similar to theirs. The decision to find against the employer's de-
fense of conditional privilege was based upon the fact that "these men
were not supervisors, personnel department representatives, nor com-
pany officials. They were simply fellow employees . . ." 37
Where the courts are severe in determining what constitutes a
sufficient interest to support the master's privilege, the privilege will
nonetheless continue to protect certain statements made by the em-
ployer concerning employees. Whether the statements are made to
employees to protect the employer's own rights38 or made to one
32 Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment II, 42 Colum.
L. Rev. 1282 (1942).
33 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 7.
34 Sokolay v. Edlin, supra note 30.
35 Stefania v. McNiff, supra note 27.
36 372 Mich. 542, 127 N. W. 2d 357 (1964).
37 Id. at 360.
38 Combes v. Montgomery Ward, supra note 29. In this case as the employer had
adequate reason to believe that statements made to the plaintiff's fellow employees
would further his own interests, the Court protected his statements as privileged
communications.
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requesting a statement as to the employee's work capabilities 39 or
made to a third party who has had dealings with the employee,40 the
defendant will be protected by the privilege so long as the statements
are made without malice and in good faith.4 1 Thus, in carefully defin-
ing the limits as to what constitutes a sufficient interest, the courts
will allow the employer to efficiently conduct his business while they
simultaneously protect the reputation of the servant.
A still greater flaw in the concept of a master's conditional privi-
lege lies in the presumption against the employer's statements being
made with malice. When the employer makes a statement concerning
his employee, pursuant to the conduct of his business, the law, as it now
stands, provides the master with the presumption of a lack of malice.42
As the employee is encumbered with the burden of proving the defend-
ant's malice 43 in order to overcome the privilege, it seems an alto-
gether unnecessary addition to his burden to require him to overcome
a rebuttable presumption in favor of the employer. Notwithstanding
the fact that the concept as to what constitutes malice is unclear and
ambiguous, 4 4 it is likewise extremely difficult to prove malice since
it is a subjective concept. To prove that malice existed in the mind of
the employer when he communicated the allegedly defamatory state-
ments requires the consideration by a jury4 5 of the objective facts
surrounding the incident. While proof of a malicious intent is difficult
in any situation, requiring the plaintiff to prove malice when his only
witnesses may be still in the employ of the defendant is rather un-
realistic.
It would appear much more reasonable, both as to procedure
and to the attainment of a just result, that neither the defendant
nor the plaintiff enjoy the presumption of a lack of malice. The
39 See, McKenna v. Mansfield Leland Hotel, 55 Ohio App. 163, 9 N. E. 2d 166 (1936);
See also, Flanagan v. McLane, 87 Conn. 220, 87 A. 727 (1913).
40 Hatch v. Lane, 105 Mass. 394 (1922).
41 New York C & St. L. R. Co. v. Schaffer, 65 Ohio St. 414, 62 N. E. 1036 (1930). This
case contains a discussion concerning the master's privilege to remain silent in an-
swer to a request for a recommendation. The case holds that he may do so with
impunity. But see (that a charge of crime is defamatory per se) Zeinfeld v. Hayes
Freight Lines, Inc., 82 Ill. 2d 463, 226 N. E. 2d 392, reversed 243 N. E. 2d 217 (Ill.
1969); and see, 1 Encyc. of Negligence, c. 18 (1962).
42 Burris v. Morton, supra note 22; Appell v. Dickinson, supra note 22; Bacon v.
Michigan Central R. R. Co., 66 Mich. 166, 33 N. W. 181 (1887).
43 See, Jorgenson v. Penn R. R. Co., 25 N. J. 541, 138 A. 2d 24 (1958); Denver Public
Warehouse Co. v. Holloway, 34 Colo. 432, 83 P. 131 (1905); See also, Bacon v.
Michigan Central R. R. Co., supra note 42.
44 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 7, at 821.
45 See, Conrad v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 228 Mo. App. 817, 73 S. W. 2d 438
(1934).
May, 1969
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removal of the aforementioned presumption would provide insurance
that both defendant and plaintiff would come before the court on
equal footing. Should the plaintiff bring his action for defamation
maliciously and without cause, the defendant has recourse to the
proper actions at law.
46
The greatest flaw in the concept of the master's conditional privi-
lege is the rule whereby the Court, and not the jury determines the
existence of a "privileged occasion" 4 i.e., under what circumstances
the privilege is available as a defense. The determination is made as
a question of law rather than as a question of fact. This is not only
prejudicial to the servant but simultaneously an error in logic.
As was mentioned previously, the concept of conditional privilege
is very often demonstrated as it exists in the master-servant relation-
ship.4s It would, therefore, appear that a predisposition exists in legal
minds which compels them to consider all master-servant relationships
as "privileged occasions" insofar as defamation is concerned. The
defendant-master must carry the burden of proving his defense of a
"privileged occasion"; 49 thus, arises the error in logic aforementioned.
The foremost consideration in determining whether or not a "privileged
occasion" exists is whether or not the statement "was fairly made
by a person in the discharge of some public or private duty, whether
legal or moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs, in matters where
his interest is concerned." 50 It appears inescapable that these deter-
minations are questions of fact and not questions of law. As each
determination is dependent upon the circumstances surrounding the
matter in question, it would be more suitable that the jury should
decide as to when the "privilege occasion" exists.
Conclusion
Though common sense and practical experience point out that
the employer is likewise vulnerable to the defamatory statements and
publications of his servants, 51 a knowledge of human nature indicates
46 The master, under these circumstances, has possible actions in Abuse of Process,
Malicious Prosecution, etc.
47 Nichols v. Eaton, 110 Iowa 509, 81 N. W. 792 (1900); Bacon v. Michigan Central
R. R. Co., supra note 42; Denver Public Warehouse Co. v. Holloway, supra note 43;
Jorgenson v. Penn R. R. Co., supra note 42.
48 See note 25 supra.
49 Prosser, op. cit. supra, note 7, p. 823.
50 Id. at 805.
51 As in Francis Mezzara's case, 2 N. Y. City Hall Recorder 113 (1900), wherein the
servant painter was to paint the employer's portrait to the satisfaction of the em-
ployer. The employer refused to accept the painting, whereupon the painter redid
the portrait, adding asses' ears to the employer's likeness. Held, criminal libel.
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that, more often than not, it is the employee who has ostensibly been
defamed. Whether it be in a department store in which a servant is
wrongfully accused of thievery52 or in an office where an employee is
mortified and disgraced by the employer's statement and actions im-
plying the employee is infected with an unpleasant disease,5 3 a master's
defamatory statements may cause serious harm to his servant.
As the right to work, to free choice of employment and protection
against unemployment are rights recognized by the United Nations
Charter,5 4 these freedoms should likewise be protected to an extent
equal with our most basic freedoms. While the conditional privilege
has developed as a corollary to the freedom of speech, it would appear
that the balance between free speech and the right to a respectable
reputation has been tilted in favor of free speech. The imbalance might
be somewhat ameliorated were our courts to take a serious look at the
conditional privilege and make some major adjustments.
A very recent case, in 1969, Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc.,55
is a hopeful sign. There, a former employer wrote in response to a
prospective employer's inquiry, that the plaintiff had left his job as
comptroller in charge of records when it was found that a substantial
amount of money was owed to the corporation, and that the plaintiff
had offered to compromise. The Illinois high court held that this was
"libelous per se." This is a significant departure from the old, lordly
"privilege" of an employer.
52 Montgomery Ward, et al. v. Skinner, 25 So. 2d 572 (Miss. 1946).
53 Cochran v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 72 Ga. 458, 34 S. E. 2d 296 (1945). The defend-
ant in this case implied the employee was infected with syphilis by having her
chair sprayed with disinfectant and announcing to her co-workers that the em-ployee had been discharged due to venereal disease. Held, no defamation as the
privilege was not abused.
54 The universal declaration of human rights adopted by the U. N. General Assem-
bly at the 183rd meeting in Paris (1948) Article 23.
55 82 Ill. 2d 463, 226 N. E. 2d 392, reversed 243 N. E. 2d 217 (Ill. Supr. Ct. 1969).
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